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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

FERNANDO RUESGA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 920426-CA
Priority No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1992 Supp.) provides
this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal from a non-capital,
non-first degree felony conviction from a court of record.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Was signing the Adult Probation and Parole agreement a
valid condition of probation at the time of Mr. Ruesga's refusal to
sign?
2. Did Mr. Ruesga willfully violate a condition of
probation?
3. Are the trial court's written and oral findings clearly
erroneous?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The trial court's factual findings are reversible if
clearly erroneous, while the trial court's legal conclusions are
subject to the correction of error standard of review.

State v.

Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241
(Utah 1991).

Because the trial court did not draft the findings

himself, but adopted those drafted by counsel, the written findings
are entitled to less deference on review.

See Automatic Control

Prods. Corp. v.Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah
1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cited with approval in State v.
Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following controlling statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions are in Appendix 1:
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18-1
Utah Code Ann. section 77-32-1
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Mr. Ruesga with one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (R. 7 ) . 1 On
February 18, 1992, Mr. Ruesga pled guilty to that charge (R. 19).
The trial court ordered him to remain unincarcerated and under the
supervision of Pretrial Services while Adult Probation and Parole
prepared the presentence investigation report (R. 20).

On March

1. Mr. Ruesga will refer to the district court pleadings
file as "R.11, to the transcript of April 6, 1992, as "T.11, to the
transcript of May 4, 1992, as "T.211, to the transcript of May 18,
1992, as "1.3", to the transcript of June 2, 1992, as "T.4", and to
the transcript of June 22, 1992, as f,T.5".
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23, 1992, the trial court ordered Adult Probation in a minute entry
as follows: "The matter is referred back to APPD to obtain a more
complete criminal history and to make the necessary matrix
corrections.

If APPD recommends prison, they must state their

reason(s) for said deviation." (R. 30).
On April 6, 1992, the trial court sentenced Mr. Ruesga to a
prison term of zero to five years and fined him $5,000 (R. 33-34).
The court stayed the sentence pending the completion of 18 months
probation, requiring Mr. Ruesga to serve six months in jail, and
suspended all of the fine except $1,500 (and required the payment of
a 25% surcharge)(R. 33-34, T. 8-9).
On April 27, 1992, Mr. Ruesga's probation officer filed a
motion for an order to show cause why Mr. Ruesga's probation should
not be revoked because he had failed to sign the probation agreement
(R. 38-39).

At the first hearing, on May 4, the trial court

indicated that defense counsel could have two weeks to work things
out, and informed Mr. Ruesga that signing the probation agreement
was a condition of his probation (T.2 4, R. 36-37).

On May 18,

1992, Mr. Ruesga was willing to sign the probation agreement, but
the trial court set a further hearing on the order to show cause (R.
43, T.3 3, 8). Following an evidentiary hearing on June 2, 1992,
the trial court denied Mr. Ruesga7s motion for a Spanish-speaking
interpreter, and revoked Mr. Ruesga's probation, despite Mr.
Ruesga's willingness to sign the agreement (R. 45-46, T.4 27).
The state submitted proposed findings of fact in support of
the revocation, to which defense counsel objected (R. 57-58), but
-3 -

the trial court signed the findings (R. 81). Defense counsel moved
the trial court to reconsider his ruling (R. 82-83), and to stay the
sentence pending appeal (R. 51-52), but the trial court denied these
motions (R. 88-89).
On September 16, 1992, this Court granted Mr. Ruesga's
petition for a certificate of probable cause, and remanded the case
to the trial court for evaluation of evidence under Utah Code Ann.
section 77-20-10(1)(c) and setting of conditions of release under
section 77-20-10(2).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court revoked Mr. Ruesga's probation because Mr.
Ruesga did not sign the probation agreement presented to him in the
jail by two probation officers ten days after sentencing.

A copy of

the trial court's written findings of probation violation is in
appendix 2 to this brief.

As defense counsel argued, Mr. Ruesga's

initial failure to sign the probation agreement was not a willful
violation of probation —

the trial court did not initially inform

Mr. Ruesga that signing the agreement was a condition of his
probation (T.4 10-11).

Once the trial court informed Mr. Ruesga

that signing the agreement was a condition of probation (T.2 4), Mr.
Ruesga was consistently willing to sign (T.3 3, T.4 11, T.5 5).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In punishing Mr. Ruesga for failing to understand and
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comply with a condition of probation that was not communicated to
Mr. Ruesga before the purported violation of that condition of
probation, the trial court violated due process of law.
Once Mr. Ruesga learned that signing the probation
agreement was a condition of probation, he was consistently willing
to fulfill that obligation.

Mr. Ruesga never willfully violated

probation.
The trial court's oral and written findings in support of
probation revocation are clearly erroneous and should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.
SIGNING THE PROBATION AGREEMENT
WAS NOT A CONDITION OF PROBATION
AT THE TIME THAT MR. RUESGA REFUSED TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT.
Our courts have historically recognized the value of
probation to both probationers and society, and have consistently
held that probation and parole revocation must be fair.

See Gaanon

v. Scarpelli, 422 U.S. 778, 783-84 (1973)(the purpose of probation
is to keep individuals functioning as productive members of
society); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1971)(society's
interest in parolee's re-integration into society is disserved by
arbitrary revocation of parole); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,
666 n.7 (1983)(probation revocations must be fundamentally fair, in
accordance with federal substantive due process).

In State v.

Zolantakis, 259 P. 1044 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that if the values of probation are to be realized,
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courts must deal fairly with probationers, stating,
The purpose of the law permitting the
suspension of sentence is clearly reformatory.
If those who are to be reformed cannot implicitly
rely upon promises or orders contained in the
suspension of sentence, then we may well expect
the law to fail in its purpose. Reformation can
certainly best be accomplished by fair,
consistent, and straightforward treatment of the
person sought to be reformed. It would therefore
seem, both upon authority and principal, that
when a sentence is suspended during good
behavior, without reservations, the person whose
sentence is thus suspended has a vested right to
rely thereon so long as such condition is
complied with. The right to personal liberty is
one of the most sacred and valuable rights of a
citizen, and should not be regarded lightly. The
right to personal liberty may be as valuable to
one convicted of crime as to one not so
convicted, and so long as one complies with the
conditions upon which such right is assured by
judicial declaration, he may not be deprived of
the same. Such right may not be alternatively
granted and denied without just cause.
Id. at 1046.
Utah historically has guarded the fairness that must govern
probation revocation, by providing greater procedural protections in
probation revocations than prevail under the federal constitution.2

2. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1971)(stating federal due process standards for parole revocation),
and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 422 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)(Morrissey
procedural rules apply to probation revocations) with Christiansen
v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945)(stating Article I section 7 due
process standards for probation revocation). Compare Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 422 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973)(courts are to decide case by
case whether counsel is necessary in probation revocation hearings)
with State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 and n.7 (Utah 1971)(under
Article I section 12, if a probationer requests counsel at a
revocation proceeding, he is entitled to counsel).
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Perhaps the most important guideline in insuring fairness
and success in probation is the rule that courts must state the
conditions of probation clearly, so that probationers can comply
with them.

In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S 430 (1973)(per curiam), the

Court held that as a matter of due process of law, a probationer
must have fair advanced warning of the conduct which constitutes a
probation violation.

Id. at 432. See also State v. Hodges, 798

P.2d 270, 277 (Utah App.)(expanding conditions of probation violates
"'the requirement that a probationer be clearly and accurately
apprised of the expectations for remaining on probation.'
v. Dennev, 776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah

See State

Ct.App.1989)(probation sentences

must be rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to avoid the
possibility of confusion and injustice)[, cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688
(Utah 1989)]; Rich v. State, 640 P.2d 159, 162 (Alaska Ct.App.
1982)(probation conditions must be sufficiently precise and
unambiguous to inform probationer of conduct essential to retain
liberty).11), cert, denied No. 900501 (Dec. 26, 1990).

As the record

discussed below demonstrates, at the time that Mr. Ruesga refused to
sign the probation agreement, the trial court had not informed Mr.
Ruesga that signing the agreement was a condition of his probation.
In sentencing Mr. Ruesga, the trial court stated various
conditions of probation, but made no mention of a need to sign a
probation agreement, or of other conditions of probation.

The

court's oral sentence is copied in Appendix 3 to this brief, and
states,
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I am going to place you on probation for a
period of eighteen months, supervised by Adult
Probation and Parole under the following terms
and conditions. I'll suspend all but $1,500 of
the fine. Added to that is the twenty-five
percent surcharge. The Court is satisfied that
terms and conditions ought to include the usual
drug and alcohol conditions. You're not to use
controlled substances, you're not to have
paraphernalia in your possession, you're not to
associate with people who use controlled
substances, and you are not to have any
prescriptions, or — from a medical Doctor,
without your probation officer knowing about it.
As far as alcohol, you're not to use alcohol
during the period of time that you're on
probation. You are to enter into, and
successfully complete any drug or alcohol
programs Adult Probation and Parole thinks [are]
appropriate. Not to, like I say, use alcohol.
You're not to frequent bars during the period of
time that you're on probation. I want you
working full-time, and I want you to establish a
permanent eiddress.
The sanction in this, Mr. Ruesga, will be
that you s€>rve six months in the county jail.
I'll give you credit for the twenty-one days that
you've already served. Commitment is forthwith.
Take him into custody.
(T. 8-9).
The trial court's written judgment, sentence and
commitment, a copy of which is in Appendix 4 to this brief, provides
a list of conditions not mentioned orally by the trial court,
including the obligation to conform to general conditions of
probation (R. 34). This sheet was apparently sent to defense
counsel at some point (neither the district court pleadings file
copy, nor counsel's file copy indicate a date of service), but not
to Mr. Ruesga.

The trial court did not mention the additional

conditions on this document when he sentenced Mr. Ruesga.
Mr. Ruesga did not speak to defense counsel prior to the
-8 -

encounter with the probation officers, and when they presented him
with the probation agreement to sign, including conditions of
probation that Mr. Ruesga had not been forewarned about by the court
or counsel prior to the encounter with the probation officers, Mr.
Ruesga refused to sign the agreement, informing the probation
officers that the conditions in the agreement were not those meted
out by the court (T.4 8-11).
It was only after the probation officer filed a motion for
an order to show cause why probation should not be revoked that the
trial court informed Mr. Ruesga that signing the probation agreement
was a condition of his probation.

At the hearing on the motion for

an order to show cause, Mr. Ruesga indicated that he had received
the motion for an order to show cause, but did not understand it
(T.2 3). Defense counsel indicated that he had advised Mr. Ruesga
to deny violating his probation at that hearing, that counsel had
just received the affidavit in support of probation revocation, and
that a personal family emergency required counsel's immediate
attention (T.2 3-4). The trial court indicated that the court would
permit counsel two weeks to works things out, and informed Mr.
Ruesga for the first time that signing the probation agreement was a
condition of probation, stating, "If Mr. Ruesga doesn't sign the
probation agreement, he's going to prison.
4).

Simple as that."

(T.2

After Mr. Ruesga was thus informed that signing the agreement

was a condition of his probation, Mr. Ruesga was consistently
willing to sign (T.3 3, T.4 11, T.5 5).
The basis for revoking Mr. Ruesga's probation reflected in
-9 -

the trial court7s written findings is Mr, Ruesga's failure to sign
the probation agreement when it was presented to him by the
probation officers (R. 60). Specifically, finding number 5
indicates,

fl

[t]hat the failure of the defendant to execute and enter

into the agreement of probation constitutes a violation of the
probation granted the defendant by the Court." (R. 60).
In revoking Mr. Ruesga's probation on the basis of a
condition of probation that Mr. Ruesga was not informed of prior to
the purported violation, the trial court violated due process of
law.

Buder, Hodges, Penney, supra.

II.
MR. RUESGA DID NOT WILLFULLY
VIOLATE HIS PROBATION.
Under Utah Code Ann. section 77-18-1, and federal
constitutional law, "[a]s a general rule, in order to revoke
probation for the violation of a condition of probation not
involving the payment of money, the violation must be willful or, if
not willful, must presently threaten the safety of society."

State

v. Hodges. 798 P.2d 270, 275-77 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied. No.
900501 (Dec. 26, 1990).
The trial court's written findings indicate that "the
defendant knowingly, intentionally and purposely refused to sign the
probation agreement presented to him by Agent Shavers" and "the
failure of the defendant to execute and enter into the agreement of
probation constitutes a violation of the probation granted the
defendant by the Court."

(R. 60). As explained above in point I,

the findings are erroneous in that the signing of the probation
-10-

agreement was not a condition of probation at the time that Mr.
Ruesga refused to sign in the jail, because the court did not inform
Mr. Ruesga of that condition when he sentenced Mr. Ruesga, or
otherwise indicate that a probation officer would present Mr. Ruesga
with additional conditions of probation.

As a corollary to the

argument in point I, the record demonstrates that Mr. Ruesga's
failure to sign the probation agreement was not a willful violation
of probation, but was a result of his failure to understand that
signing the agreement was a condition of probation.
At the first hearing, after the trial court had first
informed Mr. Ruesga that signing the agreement was a condition of
probation, and had granted a two week continuance, defense counsel
moved to dismiss the order to show cause, indicating that Mr. Ruesga
was willing to sign the probation agreement (T.3 3). After the
prosecutor indicated that Mr. Ruesga should sign the agreement in
open court, the trial court unexpectedly interjected, "I want to
know why it hasn't been signed up to this point in time.

If Mr.

Ruesga is going to jerk me around, I'll jerk him around.

Why did I

put him on probation in the first place?
position?"

What's the State's

(T.3 3-4). The prosecutor then indicated that perhaps

the court should reconsider Mr. Ruesga's probation (T.3 4). The
trial court asked defense counsel why Mr. Ruesga had not signed the
agreement and defense counsel informed the court that Mr. Ruesga had
not understood his obligation to do so in the past, but was willing
to sign the agreement that day (T.3 5). The trial court asked
defense counsel if Mr. Ruesga would admit the allegation in the
-11-

affidavit in support of the order to show cause, and defense counsel
informed the court that he had advised Mr. Ruesga not to admit a
violation (T.3 5-6). The probation officer, Lisa Shavers,indicated
that if Mr. Ruesga would sign the agreement, she was willing to
supervise him, adding that she did not like to argue with people, or
profanity (T.3 6). The trial court asked Ms. Shavers what Mr.
Ruesga had said when she presented the agreement, and she indicated,
He was very profane about you and me, and how you
could not do these things to him, and you can't
make him do what you had ordered him to do, and
so I left.
(T.3 6). Defense counsel explained that both he and Mr. Ruesga's
pretrial services supervisor had had initial difficulty
communicating with Mr. Ruesga, but had subsequently found him to be
easy to work with (T.3 7). After Mr. Ruesga acknowledged that the
court would not allow him to go to Mexico to visit his ailing
parents during the course of probation, as he had been allowed to do
during pretrial release (T.3 7-8), the trial court informed Mr.
Ruesga that Mr. Ruesga had a "serious attitude problem," and set the
matter for further hearing (T.3 8).
At the June 2, 1992 evidentiary hearing, defense counsel
requested a Spanish-speaking interpreter, b\it the trial court
summarily denied the motion, stating, "Too late.

Proceed." (T.4 3).

Ms. Shavers' testimony concerning what Mr. Ruesga had said
to her was markedly different from her prior testimony that Mr.
Ruesga had said that the judge had no power to make him comply with
the probation requirements that the judge had ordered (T.3 6). She
indicated that she initially contacted Mr. Ruesga in the jail on
-12-

April 16, ten days after Judge Hanson sentenced Mr. Ruesga (T.4 5).
She indicated that she and James Ferner, another probation officer,
spoke with Mr. Ruesga and another inmate in the hallway of the jail,
and began informing him of the general conditions of the probation
agreement (T.4 5). The conditions she explained were
That he has to report monthly between the
first and the fifth. That he has to give us a
correct address and let us know before he moves,
not leaving the State of Utah without written
permission, those kinds of things.
(T.4 5). These conditions were different from those stated to Mr.
Ruesga in court at sentencing by the trial court (T. 8-9).
She indicated that when she began discussing the conditions
of probation imposed by Judge Hanson, Mr. Ruesga informed her that
the $1,875 fine figure she had was incorrect (it represents the
correct fine plus the 25% surcharge), and became argumentative,
telling her that the written agreement did not reflect what had
occurred in court (T.4 6). Mr. Ruesga informed Ms. Shavers that her
conditions of probation were not the same as the Judge's and that he
therefore did not have to comply with them (T.4 6). She testified,
He was extremely argumentative. He said he
was not — he was not going to comply. He said
that the figure that I had for the fine of 1,875
was incorrect; that what I had written down here
was not what happened in court, that — he just
became extremely profane, and argumentative, and
got more and more so.
He said fuck the Judge, fuck this shit, I'm
not going to do it. You can't make me do it.
There was another probationer sitting next to him
who he told that that man also didn't have to do
what we were asking, that I couldn't make him do
it, and that the Judge hadn't said what I was
telling him to do.

-13-

He just continued to argue and state that he
didn't have to do what either Judge Hanson or I
was asking him to do, and he wasn't going to do
it.
(T.4 6-8).
On cross-examination, Ms. Shavers testified that Mr. Ruesga
had told her that her conditions of probation were not those stated
by the judge, and that that was why he did not have to comply with
her conditions on the agreement (T.4 8-9).
Mr. Ruesga came to the stand and read to the court a letter
he had written with assistance (T.4 10-11).

In the letter, Mr.

Ruesga explained his difficulty with the English language, his
initial failure to understand the need to sign the probation
agreement, and his willingness to sign the agreement.

He indicated

that he had not spoken with defense counsel after sentencing and did
not understand what was transpiring when the probation officers
confronted him in the jail, and that he needed an interpreter (T.4
10-11).

When defense counsel asked Mr. Ruesga if he had agreed to

sign a probation agreement when he was sentenced in court, Mr.
Ruesga indicated that he never said anything, that he had pled
guilty, and that defense counsel had not spoken with Mr. Ruesga to
explain the details of probation (T.4 11). Mr. Ruesga testified
that he had not been on probation before, and did not understand how
it worked when he refused to sign the agreement, but that since he
had come to understand his obligations, he was willing to comply
with them fully (T.4 11-12).

On cross-examination by the

prosecutor, Mr. Ruesga again indicated that he had said some words
to Ms. Shavers, but did not understand what was going on because he
-14-

had not yet spoken with defense counsel (T.4 13). Mr. Ruesga denied
having told Ms. Shavers that he did not have to comply with the
judge's orders (T.4 14), but did tell her that he would rather just
do his time in jail, rather than be on probation (T.4 14). Mr.
Ruesga7s letter to the trial court, and a letter from his pretrial
services supervisor in support of his probation are apparently
contained in the sealed envelope containing the presentence
investigation report in the district court pleadings file (R. 44).
In revoking Mr. Ruesga's probation on the basis of his
failure to sign the probation agreement, the trial court erroneously
overlooked the fact that Mr. Ruesga's failure to sign the agreement
resulted from his lack of knowledge that signing the agreement was a
condition of probation, rather than from his intent to willfully
violate the trial court's order.

The revocation constitutes a

violation of federal constitutional law.

Hodges, Buder, supra.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND REQUIRE REVERSAL.
It is the State's burden to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant has violated probation.
798 P.2d 270, 278-79 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Hodges.

The absence of an adequate

evidentiary basis for probation violation violates federal
substantive due process.

Douglas v. Buder. 412 U.S 430, 432

(1973)(per curiam).
In reviewing the evidence on appeal, this Court applies the
deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of review.
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State v.

Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241
(Utah 1991).

"In order to prevail, an appellant 'must show that the

evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable
to the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court
abused its discretion in revoking [appellant's] probation.'11

State

v. Rawlinas, 829 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah App. 1992)(citations omitted).
The written findings drafted by counsel are entitled to less
deference than would have been due had the trial court drafted the
findings himself.

See Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech.

Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring),
cited with approval in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343,
1347 (Utah 1990).

As a general rule, "[a]n appellant raising issues

of fact on appeal must, under Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshall all the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and show that
evidence to be insufficient."
(Utah App. 1991).

State v. Drobel. 815 P.2d 724, 734

However, the marshalling requirement does not

apply when the findings are legally deficient.

Woodward v. Fazzio,

823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App. 1991).
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous in several different
circumstances.

See State v, Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah

App.)("A finding is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate
evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of the
law."), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); State v. Bobo. 803
P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990)("The trial court's factual
determinations are clearly erroneous only if in conflict with the
clear weight of the evidence, or if this court has a 'definite and
-16-

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'")(citations omitted);
State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990)(to withstand
appellate review, trial court7s finding of fact must be supported by
substantial, competent evidence; prosecutor's argument does not
constitute evidence to support a finding).
The trial court's written findings, attached in Appendix 2,
indicate,
1. That the defendant, when requested by
probation officer Lisa Shavers, refused to
execute a standard probation agreement.
2. That the terms and conditions of
probation were individually explained to
defendant by Agent Shavers.
3. That the defendant, while having a
limited understanding of English, has an adequate
command of the English language to fully
understand the proceedings before this Court and
the conditions of probation as presented by Agent
Shavers.
4. That the defendant knowingly,
intentionally and purposely refused to sign the
probation agreement presented ot him by Agent
Shavers.
5. That the failure of the defendant to
execute and enter into the agreement of probation
constitutes a violation of the probation granted
the defendant by the Court.
While the evidence largely supports findings 1, 2, and 4,
points I and II of this brief demonstrate that because Mr. Ruesga
did not know that signing the probation agreement was a condition of
his probation when he refused to sign it, his refusal to sign the
agreement does not constitute a willful violation of a valid
condition of probation.

Because the trial court's fifth finding

does not recognize this critical fact, and is also thus drafted with
an incomplete view of the relevant law, the finding is clearly
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erroneous.

Cf. Jackson, Bobo, Arroyo, supra.

The trial court's third written finding, indicating that
Mr. Ruesga#s command of the English language was sufficient for him
to understand what had occurred in court and the probation
conditions stated by Agent Shavers is clearly erroneous.

First, the

finding fails to incorporate the law that it is the trial court's
duty to articulate the conditions of probation, and that it is
unfair to expand the conditions of probation retroactively to create
a violation.

E.g. Penney, supra.

While there is some evidence to

marshall in support of the facts asserted in the third finding, the
evidence is insufficient when compared with other evidence in light
of Utah law.
In his oral findings,3 the trial court concluded that Mr.
Ruesga understood enough English because he had not indicated a
failure to understand English in prior proceedings, had participated
in the Boykin process and reviewed the affidavit during the plea
proceedings (the affidavit indicates that Mr. Ruesga understands
English or had had an interpreter (R. 26)), and had handwritten and
read the letter presented to the trial court at the evidentiary

3. Reference to oral findings is proper practice. See e.g.
Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1989)("In assessing the
sufficiency of the findings [in a domestic bench trial], ... we are
not confined to the contents of a particular document entitled
"Findings"; rather, the findings may be expressed orally from the
bench or contained in other documents, such as the quite thorough
memorandum decision of the trial court in this case.")(footnotes,
citing inter alia Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), omitted). See
also State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 273-74 (Utah App.)(written
findings of fact are not necessary if court can discern basis of
revocation from transcript and record of proceedings), cert, denied.
No. 900501 (Dec. 26, 1990).
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hearing (T.4 22-23).
The trial court's indication that Mr. Ruesga had not
previously indicated an inability to understand (T.4 22) is clearly
erroneous.

At the first hearing on the order to show cause why

probation should not be revoked, Mr. Ruesga indicated to the court
that he had received the order to show cause, but did not understand
it (T.2 3). At the second hearing, defense counsel attributed Mr.
Ruesga's failure to sign the probation agreement to his failure to
understand the obligation, and indicated that defense counsel and
the pretrial services supervisor had initial difficulty
communicating with Mr. Ruesga

(T.3 5, 7). At the third hearing

defense counsel repeated his concerns that Mr. Ruesga's heavy accent
and previous difficulties communicating with defense counsel were
indicative of his difficulty understanding the court proceedings
(T.4 19) .
As Mr. Ruesga testified, he had assistance composing the
letter he wrote and read to the trial court (T.4 10). The same
alphabet is used in Spanish and English, and Mr. Ruesga's ability to
handwrite and read a letter that someone else assisted him in
composing does not necessarily indicate that Mr. Ruesga had an
adequate understanding of the court proceedings.
While Mr. Ruesga had participated in the Bovkin process and
signed the plea affidavit, testimony concerning the confrontation
between Mr. Ruesga and the probation officers demonstrates that Mr.
Ruesga did not have an adequate command of the English language to
understand the court proceedings, and that this contributed to the
-19-

purported probation violation.

For instance, Mr. Ruesga thought

that Ms. Shavers presented the wrong figure when she told him that
he owed a fine of $1,875 (T.4 6). The figure represents the $1,500
fine stated at sentencing, plus the 25% surcharge stated at the
sentencing (T.4 6; T. 8). Mr. Ruesga's inability to understand the
proceedings is demonstrated by the fact that he thought that his
sentence would be eighteen months if he did not complete probation
(T.4 14). The probation period ordered by the trial court was
eighteen months, but the suspended sentence that Mr. Ruesga has to
serve without probation is the zero to five year prison sentence (R.
33) .
The trial court's cursory ruling at the outset of the
evidentiary hearing in response to defense counsel's request for an
interpreter, "Too late.

Proceed." (T.4 3), demonstrates a failure

to appreciate the significance of the need of a criminal defendant
or probationer to understand the proceedings in order to exercise
his rights.
In State v. Vasquez. 121 P.2d 903 (Utah 1942), the court
reviewed a trial court's refusal to provide an interpreter for the
defendant, whose native language was Spanish, and who also was
unable to hear some of the witnesses.

The court drew from cases

decided under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution,
explaining that when a defendant cannot hear or understand the
proceedings, he is unable to "appear and defend in person" or to
confront the witnesses against him.

Id. at 905.

The court

discussed at length the fact that a defendant who cannot understand
-20-

the language of the proceedings cannot obtain a fair trial or
meaningfully exercise his trial rights.

Id. at 906.

In holding

that the State should provide interpreters for indigent defendants,
the court noted, "Although nominally prosecuting, the state is as
interested in proving the innocence as the guilt of the party
charged."

Id. at 906. The court concluded, "'if in any such case,

the record indicates a failure to provide an interpreter has in any
manner hampered the defendant in presenting his case to the jury, we
shall hold a fair and impartial trial has been denied him.,M
906 (citation omitted, emphasis added).

Id. at

See also State v. Drobel,

815 P.2d 724, 737 (Utah 1991)("Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, provides that a trial court 'may appoint an interpreter
of its own selection. ...,,f

While this decision is a matter of

discretion, our supreme court has held that it is better, in a
questionable case, to err on the side of providing an interpreter.
State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903, 906 (1942).

. ..

Failure to appoint an interpreter, however, is reversible error only
when the record shows that the defendant's presentation of the case
has thereby been hampered.

Vasquez, 121 P.2d at 906.").

While the Vasquez and Drobel cases are set in the context
of criminal trials, rather than the context of probation revocation,
their principles ring true in this case.

Because Mr. Ruesga did not

understand English well enough, his ability to exercise all of his
rights, including the right to understand the conditions of
probation, was compromised.

The people of this State have an

interest in seeing that Mr. Ruesga has a fair opportunity to succeed
-21-

in assimilating back into society through probation.

By failing to

recognize the contribution that language barriers made in this case,
the trial court violated Mr. Ruesga's rights and disserved society's
interest in Mr. Ruesga's success.

The trial court's finding that

Mr. Ruesga's command of the English language was adequate is clearly
erroneous.

Jackson, Bobo, Arroyo, supra.

At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Mr.
Ruesga violated his probation by his "abuse" of Agent Shavers (T.4
21-22).

This findincf is clearly erroneous because it reflects a

misunderstanding of the law.
The trial court never informed Mr. Ruesga that his
probation was conditioned on his conversations with Agent Shavers.
This was not a condition of probation, and Mr. Ruesga did not
willfully violate it.

See points I and II, supra.

More

importantly, Mr. Ruesga was not given notice that the probation
revocation hearings would encompass any allegations other than his
failure to sign the probation agreement, the only allegation in the
order to show cause (R. 38). In revoking probation on the basis of
this unwarned allegation, the trial court violated Mr. Ruesga's
rights to due process of law.

See State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205,

211 (Utah App. 1991)(if, in probation revocation, court relies on
bases other than those alleged in documents initiating probation
revocation, defendant is denied the due process rights to notice and
the chance to present a defense), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah
1991); State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981)(documents giving
notice of grounds for probation revocation must be drawn so as to
-22-

give sufficient notice to allow a defense; court may not revoke
probation on the basis of allegations or evidence not mentioned in
order to show cause).
Finally, the court found that Mr. Ruesga had violated his
probation in refusing to sign the probation agreement at the first
hearing on the motion for an order to show cause why probation
should not be revoked.

The court stated,

I think that's further enhanced by what has
occurred since that was brought to my attention.
One would assume if there is a misunderstanding
as alleged by the defendant, that I found did not
occur, but he understood what was happening, but
even if that was believable, which it is not,
certainly when he found out what was going to
happen, one would expect him to immediately do
what was necessary to remedy the situation for
his first appearance in court. The record will
speak for itself. But his first appearance in
court, according to my recollection, was further
attempts to argue and explain why he didn't have
to do the things he was supposed to do.
(T.4 21)(emphasis added).

The court indicated that there was "a

clear opportunity to sign" the probation agreement, and that his
refusal to sign constituted a probation violation (T.4 21).
When defense counsel sought to correct the court, and
indicated that Mr. Ruesga had not refused to sign the agreement in
court, the court stated,
Not true, Mr. Scowcroft. He may have said
it as he was going out the door, but he wanted to
argue with me the first time he was here. I'm
not going to argue with people about probation.
If they don't want to be on probation, I don't
care.
(T.4 23).
This finding was clearly erroneous as a matter of fact and
-23-

law.
Mr. Ruesga's only statements at that hearing wherein the
court thought he had refused to sign the agreement were that he was
Fernando Ruesga, and that he had seen the motion for an order to
show cause, but did not understand it (T. 3).
Again, in revoking probation on the basis of an allegation
that was not contained in the affidavit in support of the motion for
an order to show cause why probation should not be revoked, the
trial court violated Mr. Ruesga's right to due process of law.
Martinez. Cowdell supra.

CONCLUSION
This probation revocation was fundamentally unfair, in
violation of the State and Federal Constitutions.

This Court should

reverse the trial court's order revokina Mr. Ruesga's probation.

(J
Respectfully submitted this^T/^^day of October, 1992.

^-^c^C**ROGER K. SC0WCR0FT
Attorney for,Mr. Ruesg

m

ELIZABETH IfPLBfeOOK
Attorney foirJMr. Ruesga
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APPENDIX 1
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions

TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.

Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the
United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18-1 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in
pertinent part:
77-18.1. Suspension of sentence—Probation—
Supervision—Presentence investigation—
Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and
conditions— Restitution—Termination/
revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings.

(9) (a) Probation may not be modified or
extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and a
finding in court that the probationer has
violated the conditions of probation.
Probation may not be revoked except upon a
hearing in court and a finding that the
conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit
alleging with particularity facts asserted
to constitute violation of the conditions of
probation, the court that authorized
probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that

revocation, modification, or extension of
probation is justified. If the court
determines there is probable cause, it shall
cause to be served on the defendant a
warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his
probation should not be revoked, modified,
or extended.
(c) The order to show cause shall
specify a time and place for the hearing,
and shall be served upon the defendant at
least five days prior to the hearing. The
defendant shall show good cause for a
continuance. The order to show cause shall
inform the defendant of a right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to
have counsel appointed for him if he is
indigent. The order shall also inform the
defendant of a right to present evidence.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant
shall admit or deny the allegations of the
affidavit. If the defendant denies the
allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence
on the allegations. The persons who have
given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as
witnesses subject to questioning by the
defendant unless the court for good cause
otherwise orders. The defendant may call
witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) After the hearing the court shall
make findings of fact. Upon a finding that
the defendant violated the conditions of
probation the court may order the probation
revoked, modified, continued, or that the
entire probation term commence anew. If
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed
shall be executed.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-1 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides:
77-23-1. "Search warrant11 defined.
A search warrant is an order issued by a
magistrate in the name of the state and directed
to a peace officer, describing with particularity
the thing, place or person to be searched and the
property or evidence to be seized by him and
brought before the magistrate.

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Rule 15. Expert witnesses and interpreters.
(a) The court may appoint any expert
witness agreed upon by the parties or of its own
selection. An expert so appointed shall be
informed of his duties by the court in writing, a
copy of which shall be filed. An expert so
appointed shall advise the court and the parties
of his findings and may thereafter be called to
testify by the court or by any party. He shall
be subject to cross-examination by each party.
The court shall determine the reasonable
compensation of the expert and direct payment
thereof. The parties may call expert witnesses
of their own at their own expense. Upon showing
that a defendant is financially unable to pay the
fees of an expert whose services are necessary
for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be
paid as if he were called on behalf of the
prosecution.
(b) The court may appoint an interpreter
of its own selection and shall determine
reasonable compensation and direct payment
thereof. The court may allow counsel to question
the interpreter before he is sworn to discharge
the duties of an interpreter.

APPENDIX 2
Written Findings of Probation Violation

SaltXak© Cbuhly^Attorney"
W A L T E R R. ELLETT, 0 9 8 0

Chief Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
)

THE STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF PROBATION
VIOLATION AND COMMITMENT

)

v.

Case No. 911901842FS

FERNANDO RUESGA,

Honorable Timothy R. Hansen

Defendant.
)

Having heretofore adjudged the defendant guilty of the offense of
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, the Court, on the
6th day of April, 1992, imposed sentence on the defendant that the defendant be
committed to the Utah State Prison for the term not to exceed five years, and
was fined as provided by law for the offense of which the defendant was
adjudged guilty.
The Court stayed the execution of such sentences and placed the
defendant on probation in the custody of the Chief Agent, Department of Adult
Probation and Parole, upon various conditions.
On the 2nd day of June, 1992, the defendant appeared in person and with
counsel, Roger Scowcroft, to answer to an affidavit in support of an Order of

Show Cause in re the revocation OT defendant's probation.

The State was

represented by Walter R. Ellett.
The Court received evidence by way of testimony and written exhibits.
Exhibit number 2 was a hand written and signed statement prepared by and
submitted by the defendant.
Based upon the evidence presented and considering arguments of
counsel the Court finds as follows:
1.

That the defendant, when requested by probation officer Lisa

Shavers, refused to execute a standard probation agreement.
2.

That the terms and conditions of probation were individually

explained to defendant by Agent Shavers.
3.

That the defendant, while having a limited understanding of

English, has an adequate command of the English language to fully understand
the proceedings before this Court and the conditions of probation as presented
by Agent Shavers.
4.

That the defendant knowingly, intentionally and purposely refused

to sign the probation agreement presented to him by Agent Shavers.
5.

That the failure of the defendant to execute and enter into the

agreement of probation constitutes a violation of the probation granted the
defendant by the Court.
From the foregoing findings the Court now enters the following order and
judgment.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the probation of the defendant Fernando Ruesga be and the

same is hereby revoked.
2.

It is further ordered that the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah take the defendant Fernando Ruesga forthwith and deliver him to the

000Cf;n

^WSfdenl'Utah State Prison, D r a p e r / U T , where said defendant snail De connnea

ana impnsonea in accordance with the sentence imposed on April 6,1992.
3.

It is recommended that the defendant be given credit for time

served in this matter.
Dated this

I

day of June, 1992.
BY TflE COURT

U

'/TIMOTHY R. H A N ^ E N X ^
^rf^^2^

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

Delivered a copy of the foregoing Findings and Order to Roger Scowcroft,
Attorney for Defendant, by placing the same in the Legal Defenders Association
courier box at the Office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South,
for pick-up and delivery to the said Roger Scowcroft this

5

day of June, 1992.

y/< kk&fxH
carol\memo\ruesga.doc

y
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APPENDIX 3
Trial Court's Oral Sentence

1

to the crime of possession of a controlled substance, a

2

third degree felony, it's the judgment of this Court that

3

you be committed to the Utah State Prison for the

4

judgment, that's the indeterminate term which may be for

5

as long as five years, and I also impose the maximum fine

6

of $5,000. Mr. Ruesga, as I review this, while most of

7

these records have been destroyed, I don't know what's

8

happened, I don't make any decision one way or another in

9

that regard, but I think that shows to me that there

10

isn't sufficient justification for deviating from the

11

guidelines in this case, nor am I otherwise impressed

12

that the guidelines ought to be deviated from.

13

indication whether these prior charges were convictions,

14

whether they ever occurred.

15

destroyed, that's unfortunate, but it has.

16

I do believe that you're an appropriate candidate for

17

probation.

18

recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole, because I

19

can see no legal basis as to why they should deviate from

20

the guidelines.

I have no

And if the file has been
Accordingly,

Accordingly, I'm going to deviate from the

21

I am going to place you on probation for a period of

22

eighteen months, supervised by Adult Probation and Parole

23

under the following terms and conditions.

24

all but $1,500 of the fine.

25

twenty-five percent surcharge.

I'll suspend

Added to that is the
The Court is satisfied
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1

that terms and conditions ought to include the usual drug

2

and alcohol conditions.

3

substances, you're not to have paraphernalia in your

4

possession, you're not to associate with people who use

5

controlled substances, and you are not to have any

6

prescriptions, or —

7

probation officer knowing about it.

8
9

You're not to use controlled

from a medical Doctor, without your

As far as alcohol, you're not to use alcohol during
the period of time that you're on probation.

You are to

10

enter into, and successfully complete any drug or alcohol

11

programs Adult Probation and Parole thinks is

12

appropriate.

13

not to frequent bars during the period of time that

14

you're on probation.

15

want you to establish a permanent address.

16

Not to, like I say, use alcohol.

You're

I want you working full-time, and I

The sanction in this, Mr. Ruesga, will be that you

17

serve six months in the county jail.

18

credit for the twenty-one days that you've already

19

served.

Commitment is forthwith.

I'll give you

Take him into custody.

20
21

*

*

*

22
23
24
25
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APPENDIX 4
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF U T A H
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

Case No. .
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter _
Bailiff
Date

vs.
FERNANDO RUESGA

CPTS)

Defendant.

9119018^2 FS
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
E. THOMPSON
B. NEUENSCHWANDER
J , WEISS
APRIL 6 , 1992

to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is D granted Q denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; & plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
a felony
of the 1
degree, O a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented **• S C 0 W C R O F T
and the State being represented by K - H 0 R N A K
, is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
(3
D
D
D
iS
D

years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
5,000
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
to

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)
— — — — — . i _ _ _ _ _ are herebv dismissed
THE COURT SUSPENDS ALL BUT $1,500 OF THE FINE TO BE PAID ALONG WITH A 25% SURCHARGE
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Qcprison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of _ 1 S
MONTHS
pursuant to the attached<tonditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Cou^fy D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jaik'where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and CommUment
Commitment shall issue
DATED this

COPIES TO COUNSEL
Defense Counsel

6 - day of

J92.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
. TIMOTHY R. HANSON
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CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
JO Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole.
& Serve
SIX MONTHS
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing
FORTHWITH. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVFD.
& Pay a fine In the amount of $JU5flfiL) at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole; or cXat the rate of
W I T H I N T H F P R O R A T I O N P F R I O D . A 2S % SURPHAPCF APPI TFS .
D Pay restitution in the amount of $
; or D in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of
; or • at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
& Enter, participate in, and complete any , DRIJG/A1 fDHOI
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.

D Enter, participate in, and complete the

program at

D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training D as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with .
z.
D Participate in and complete any
training D as directed by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; or D with
JO Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
B Submit to drug testing."
XJ Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
JO Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
JO Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
JO Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
JO Submit to testing for alcohol use.
JO Take antabuse C)<as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
JO Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
D Maintain full-time employment.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant
Defendant'sisprobation
be transferred
to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
D
to have nomay
contact
nor associate
with

by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation

and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
%1 Defendant is to commit no crimes.
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on
X3

days in jail.
for a review of this sentence

THF nFFFNfWJT i q TO FCjTARI T^H PF^inFMrY
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DATED this

6_ day of
JUDGE
r?!l§JRICT*COURT
i f i o f h Y R, HANSON
-T\

^N

**v

^

